Risk Management

Wholesale Investor Rules: Calling a Cat a Fish

Article #468

Abraham Lincoln liked to ask how many legs a dog has if you count the tail as one. Four, he said: calling the tail a leg doesn’t make it a leg. New Zealand’s wholesale investor rules have spent a decade calling tails legs. Last week a Christchurch courtroom finally counted.

On Friday 24 July the High Court placed six companies in Bernard Whimp’s Chance Voight group into liquidation. Associate Judge Dale Lester found a pattern of obfuscation, incompetence and evasion, an entirely unsustainable model, and a scheme that could only pay existing investors by finding new ones. Founded in 2021, the group had raised more than $54 million from perhaps 230 people to pour into property-based wholesale debt promising returns of 10 to 13 per cent a year. By September 2025 it sat on a negative net asset position of $11.8 million. The evidence, the judge said, was overwhelming.

One detail is almost too good. Whimp asked the court to delay the hearing until he could unlock money from his late father’s estate, which, he said, would in turn fund a $110 million land development. The judge was unmoved, calling the request a microcosm of how the whole group had been run. Quite. You cannot conjure a solvent business from a deceased estate any more than you can pull a rabbit from an empty hat, though plenty have tried. Meanwhile a related Whimp entity had drawn some $9.2 million in “management fees”, around 24 per cent of all money invested, even as the group booked a $5.5 million trading loss in a single half-year. Fees, in other words, for failure.

Here is what should trouble every reader. Chance Voight’s investors were, in the main, aged 65 and over, and the first liquidators’ report found many had only a limited grasp of the risks. Yet each had been certified a “wholesale” investor: sophisticated enough, in law, to need no protection at all.

You can call a cat a fish, but you can’t teach it to swim.

The mechanism is simple. The Financial Markets Conduct Act lets companies raise money without disclosure, licensing or supervision, provided the investors are wholesale. Under the “eligible investor” rule, anyone can claim that badge so long as a financial adviser, chartered accountant or lawyer signs to agree. Tick the box, and every retail protection evaporates. And this was no discreet, professional affair: the court noted Chance Voight was marketed in regional and local newspapers, on Facebook and at in-person promotional events, the mass channels of the retail world, not the closed room of the true professional.

A long process for a too-low bar 

The regulator has been uneasy for years. When the FMA took a test case to force issuers to verify the investors sent their way, it lost: Justice Fitzgerald found the permissive regime was a feature of the law, not a bug. But she put her finger on the fault. The problem, she observed, was not so much the content of the certificates as that certificates with patently defective grounds, or none at all, were being confirmed regardless. It is the confirmation process that is falling down; and if it cannot protect investors, the balance struck in the legislation may need resetting, a matter, she said, for Parliament and not the court.

That was the judiciary handing the problem to the politicians. This month, at last, they picked it up. Commerce Minister Cameron Brewer has released an MBIE consultation, part two of the plan to lift our capital markets, that concedes what advisers have muttered for years: our settings are an international outlier, “unique” and “relatively permissive,” with “some evidence” that inexperienced investors are getting into wholesale offers. Its options read like a reply to Fitzgerald: a more objective eligibility test, a cap on how much an eligible investor can put at risk, a requirement that applicants take independent financial advice, restrictions on wholesale advertising, and, squarely, real onus on the professional confirmer, with an infringement offence for inadequate certifications.

Click above to read more on Wholesale Investors from the Financial Markets Authority

What still needs attention 

Those are the right levers, and they should be pulled. None of this is an argument for tearing the regime down. Genuine sophisticated investors exist, and raising capital from them without the full disclosure burden is a legitimate and valuable part of a working market. MBIE rightly notes that certificates lasting only two years already make life needlessly costly for real professionals. The point is narrower. The bar has been set too low, left to rot, and waved through by people with every incentive not to look too closely. Consider that none of the thresholds, $5 million in net assets, a million-dollar investment history, a $750,000 minimum subscription, has been adjusted for inflation since the Act took effect in 2013. Thirteen years of asset-price growth, house prices above all, has done the widening for Parliament: the same numbers now capture people they were never meant to reach. The bar did not get more generous; the country simply ran up more nominal dollars against a line that never moved. Last year the FMA referred 22 accountants and eight lawyers to their professional bodies over the misuse of these very certificates.

Two gaps deserve more than the paper gives them.

The first is the advice layer. A retail adviser must put the client’s interests first and prove a recommendation is suitable: goals, cash flow and appetite for risk, all understood and documented, the file running to fifty pages. A wholesale-only adviser owes a bare statutory duty to give priority to the client’s interests, but needs no FMA licence, follows no Code of Professional Conduct, and never has to establish that the advice was suitable. The relationship can be purely transactional: take the $5 million, place it in a syndicate, move on. If you think professional advice is expensive, try the amateur variety.

The second is the Crown’s own hand. Of the roughly 70 managed funds on Invest NZ’s “acceptable” list for Active Investor Plus migrants, against nearly $1.5 billion of committed capital, all but a handful are wholesale, and few are household names. Invest NZ’s own disclaimer states that inclusion is not an endorsement or recommendation by it or the Government. We invite wealthy newcomers to make this country home, steer them onto a state-curated list, then wash our hands of what follows. All care, no responsibility. A wealthy migrant, a surgeon, a farmer, someone who simply inherited well, may know nothing of geared, illiquid property debt, yet is stamped “wholesale” on a net-asset figure alone. Funds on a Crown list should answer to retail-grade disclosure, not hide behind the wholesale tag.

Underneath it all sits a regulator half in the dark. The IMF warned back in 2017 that there was insufficient data to assess the risks in our wholesale sector; nine years on, the FMA has admitted it still has very little sense of the size, structure or practices of that market. You cannot police what you have never measured.

Two centuries ago the little port of Kōrorareka, on the same Bay of Islands coast that cradled New Zealand’s first capital, was infamous as the Hell Hole of the Pacific, a settlement beyond the reach of any law. We renamed it Russell, gentrified it, and told ourselves the lawlessness was history. But a regime that lets an operator gather tens of millions from retirees on a one-page certificate nobody properly checks, through advisers who owe them little and a regulator the courts say owes them nothing, has not left the frontier behind. One judge has wound the companies up. Another has told Parliament what to fix. Submissions close on 25 August. Make sure the reform closes the loophole, rather than merely repaints the saloon.*

* Stewart Group does not provide advice to investors under the wholesale investor rules. We took that decision years ago, in the view that all investors deserve full disclosure and a fiduciary relationship. 


Further Reading: For those interested in the wholesale investor discussion, this guide provides a practical overview of the key differences between retail and wholesale investors, including eligibility criteria, investor protections and regulatory requirements.


Nick Stewart

(Ngāi Tahu, Ngāti Huirapa, Ngāti Māmoe,
Ngāti Waitaha)

Financial Adviser and CEO at Stewart Group

  • Stewart Group is a Hawke's Bay and Wellington based CEFEX & BCorp certified financial planning and advisory firm providing personal fiduciary services, Wealth Management, Risk Insurance & KiwiSaver scheme solutions.

  • The information provided, or any opinions expressed in this article, are of a general nature only and should not be construed or relied on as a recommendation to invest in a financial product or class of financial products. You should seek financial advice specific to your circumstances from a Financial Adviser before making any financial decisions. A disclosure statement can be obtained free of charge by calling 0800 878 961 or visit our website, www.stewartgroup.co.nz


REFERENCES

1. “Court slams Whimp entities into liquidation; Kerr bankrupted in the UK.” David Chaplin, Investment News NZ, 26 July 2026.

2. “‘Unsustainable’ Chance Voight companies put into liquidation.” NBR, 24 July 2026 — judgment of Associate Judge Dale Lester; Teneo’s John Fisk, Lara Bennett and Malcolm Hollis appointed liquidators; comments of FMA enforcement head Margot Gatland.

3. David Chaplin, “Wholesale investment: there’s a hole in the market.” BusinessDesk, 21 July 2026.

4. “Government looking at wholesale investor loophole.” Good Returns, 17 July 2026; “Government seeks feedback on loophole exposing unsavvy investors to risky deals.” NZ Herald, July 2026.

5. Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, capital markets reform discussion paper (part two), July 2026. Submissions close 25 August 2026.

6. First interim liquidators’ report on the Chance Voight group (PwC), 2026 — investor age profile and limited risk understanding; “management fees” of $9.2m, some 24% of funds invested; $5.5m half-year trading loss; negative net assets of $11.8m at 30 September 2025.

7. Financial Markets Authority, [2025] NZHC 2723 — judgment of Fitzgerald J (18 September 2025) on the confirmation process and the balance struck in the legislation.

8. Financial Markets Authority — referral of 22 accountants and eight lawyers to their professional bodies over misuse of eligible investor certificates.

9. International Monetary Fund, Financial Sector Assessment Programme, New Zealand, 2017; FMA review of custody arrangements, 2026.

10. Invest New Zealand / Immigration New Zealand, Active Investor Plus visa: list of acceptable managed investment schemes and non-endorsement disclaimer.

11. Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, Part 3 and Schedule 1.

12. “Kōrorareka — the Hell Hole of the Pacific.” Te Ara / NZ History, Ministry for Culture and Heritage.


Scotland the Brave - The Darien Scheme That Worked

Feature Article

 

A Canny View reader asked an excellent question after last month's column: what was the alternative? What would have happened if the Darien project had been successful?

Whilst I don't hold myself out to be a historian, I do find alternative history enjoyable reading, with its endless what-ifs.

Last month's piece (If you missed it, read heretook up Scotland's catastrophic 1698 bet on a trading colony in Panama, the one that bankrupted the nation and led, within a decade, to its loss of sovereignty to England. The lesson, plainly, was about concentration risk: bet a fifth of your wealth on one thing, and you had better be ready for the day it doesn't work.

But what if it had worked? Indulge me a moment.

It is 1698. William Paterson's vision holds. Disease is mastered through better drainage and stricter quarantine. The Spanish, having sized up Caledonia's defences, choose negotiation over assault. The English, sensing they cannot beat the Scots to the Isthmus, partner instead of obstruct.

Within a decade, Caledonia is the trading hub of the Americas. Goods from Canton and Manila are landed on the Atlantic side, hauled across a few miles of jungle, and reloaded onto ships bound for Edinburgh and Amsterdam. The Company of Scotland pays a 40% dividend in 1710. It pays one again in 1715.

Scotland enters the 18th century rich. There is no bankruptcy. No loss of sovereignty. Edinburgh, not London, becomes northern Europe's financial centre. Adam Smith, born in 1723, writes The Wealth of Nations in a country that does not need to borrow England's economic theory; it has its own.

The story doesn't stop there. The Acts of Union, in our real history, were the price Scotland paid for the Darien bankruptcy. Take the bankruptcy away, and the union never happens. So when Queen Anne dies in 1714 and the English Parliament invites George of Hanover to take the throne, the Scottish Parliament is free to make its own choice, and reaffirms the Stuart line. James Francis Edward becomes James VIII of Scotland. His son Charles Edward never has to invade in 1745, because his father is already sitting in Edinburgh.

Which means no Battle of Culloden in 1746. No Disarming Act. No proscription of Highland dress, no systematic dismantling of clan structures. Which means no Highland Clearances. Which means the great Scottish diaspora of the 19th century, the one that founded Dunedin in 1848 and put Scottish names on half the farms in Hawke's Bay, never happens, or happens at a fraction of the scale.

A successful Darien does not just save Scotland's sovereignty. It rewrites the demographic map of New Zealand.

And by the late 19th century, when the world's powers turn their attention to cutting a canal through the Isthmus, the Scots have been there for two hundred years. They have the local knowledge, the capital, and the political will. The canal opens, somewhere between 1890 and 1905, under Scottish ownership. One of the world's great chokepoints, the gate between the Atlantic and the Pacific, is not American. It is Scottish.

Speaking for myself, I highly doubt either my maternal or paternal ancestors would have made the journey from Perthshire, Scotland.

Paterson gets a statue on Princes Street. And every Scot who didn't subscribe is haunted, for the rest of their life, by what they missed.

This is the harder lesson.

The bet that pays off gets remembered as vision. The same bet that fails gets remembered as folly. The two bets were identical.

Imagine two funds in 2020. Both concentrate. Both bet on a small basket of high-conviction names. Five years later, one is celebrated as a genius and the other is torn apart in print. The portfolios looked identical at the start. The strategies were the same. What differed was which way the dice landed.

This is survivorship bias, and it is the great mischief-maker of finance. We study Buffett, not the thousand value managers who concentrated and lost. We celebrate the founder who bet the company and won, not the ten who bet and quietly disappeared. The lesson taught is that conviction beats prudence. The lesson untaught is that survival beats both.

When concentration works, you don't learn the right thing. You learn that the rules don't apply to you, and you bet bigger next time. The next Darien is always larger than the last.

What does this mean for a Canny investor at the kitchen table?

It means diversification is not, as the fund manager class sometimes implies, a strategy for the meek. It is the structure that lets you stay in the game on the day the dice land wrong. And sooner or later, they will.

The business owner whose company is 80% of their wealth is not bold; they are exposed. The retiree leveraged into a single Hawke's Bay property is not bold; they are exposed. The investor who has refused to trim a winner that now dominates the portfolio is not bold; they have simply been right so far. That is all.

The Scots who didn't subscribe in 1698 missed a fortune in the world I just imagined. In the world we actually got, they kept theirs.

Across enough rolls of the dice, the second outcome is the one that matters. The first is the one you read about.

We always enjoy the dialogue with our Canny View followers, so please keep up the great feedback, and we'll do our best to accommodate.

Nick Stewart

(Ngāi Tahu, Ngāti Huirapa, Ngāti Māmoe,
Ngāti Waitaha)

Financial Adviser and CEO at Stewart Group

  • Stewart Group is a Hawke's Bay and Wellington based CEFEX & BCorp certified financial planning and advisory firm providing personal fiduciary services, Wealth Management, Risk Insurance & KiwiSaver scheme solutions.

  • The information provided, or any opinions expressed in this article, are of a general nature only and should not be construed or relied on as a recommendation to invest in a financial product or class of financial products. You should seek financial advice specific to your circumstances from a Financial Adviser before making any financial decisions. A disclosure statement can be obtained free of charge by calling 0800 878 961 or visit our website, www.stewartgroup.co.nz


Private Assets: You're Not Joining the Club, You're Funding It

Article # 463

Private. Special. Exclusive. Three words that do a lot of heavy lifting in finance. They frame private equity and private credit as access and privilege. Yet beneath the velvet-rope marketing sits a familiar set of trade-offs: high fees, illiquidity, and a lack of transparency. For decades that rope kept ordinary investors out. It was quietly removed, and nobody sent a memo.

Historically, these markets belonged to pension funds, endowments and family offices with eight figures to commit and twelve years to wait. Ordinary investors didn't get a seat at the table. They are now being offered one, through KiwiSaver growth funds, UK Long-Term Asset Funds dropped inside tax-advantaged ISAs, and the family trust portfolios they signed off on last year [1]. The FMA confirmed in April that most KiwiSaver providers expect to materially lift their private asset allocations over the next three years, aligning with global investment trends [2]. The industry calls it democratisation. Governments call it unlocking growth.

This week the trend turned local and concrete. Simplicity committed $30 million to a new Kiwi deep tech and health sciences venture fund, becoming a cornerstone investor [3]. The fund holds a small number of early-stage companies, including pre-revenue biotech automating cancer-cell therapy manufacturing. It is not fully funded on day one; it is a capital-call vehicle, drawn down over the life of the fund. The parent is US-headquartered, and the capital base includes migrant investors using it as a pathway to residency. None of that is hidden, and backing clever Kiwi innovation is a perfectly defensible thing to do. But it is a useful reminder of what this asset class is once you look inside the wrapper: a long-dated, illiquid, concentrated bet that you cannot easily value or exit.

About that 40-year outperformance

In January, Tony Robbins told millions of viewers on The Diary of a CEO that private equity has outperformed every stock market globally for 40 years, and that ordinary investors have been locked out [4]. He is right on the data. The data, however, deserves a closer look before you remortgage the bach.

First, it has been cherry-picked by survivorship. The funds that blew up quietly drop out of the long-run series, so what you are shown is the record of the survivors, a bit like judging parachutes by interviewing the people who landed. Second, much of the return is leverage, not skill; borrow heavily against a stable business and you amplify the good years, and the bad. Third, and least discussed, is the illiquidity premium. You are tying your money up for a decade or more in a speculative bet on a handful of companies you cannot sell when you want to. You would expect to be paid more for taking on more risk and less liquidity. That extra return is not evidence of genius; it is the rent on your patience. Strip out dead funds, borrowed money and locked-up capital, and the heroic outperformance narrows sharply, and that is before fees [5].

What Robbins is less keen to dwell on is that he co-owns CAZ Investments, which buys stakes in private equity management companies, and that he personally holds stakes in 95 PE firms; the firms themselves, not the funds [6]. He collects the "2 and 20" on each: two percent of assets every year, plus twenty percent of profits above a hurdle [4]. Draw your own conclusions about the shape of those incentives.

The cycle, and the cautionary tale

On the credit side, JPMorgan chief Jamie Dimon used his April shareholder letter to flag what the more enthusiastic salespeople tend to leave in the bag: the credit cycle still exists [7]. Lending standards loosened during the boom. Covenant-lite deals became common in private credit too [8]. When the cycle turns, losses will not stay gated.

In August 2024, the Government placed Du Val Group, an Auckland property developer, into statutory management. This is only the third time that lever has ever been pulled, following Equiticorp in 1989 and Allan Hubbard's vehicles in 2010 [9].

The Du Val Mortgage Fund had been marketed as wholesale-only at around 10% per annum, pitched as comparing favourably to bank term deposits. That label is not a marketing flourish but a regulatory category: an offer made only to wholesale investors is excluded from the disclosure regime built to protect ordinary investors, so there is no product disclosure statement and no entry on the public Disclose register [9]. Roughly 120 to 150 investors are now owed close to $306 million [9]. When investors tried to sue the FMA for failing to protect them, the High Court ruled in Lindeman Investments v FMA that the regulator owes no duty of care to individual wholesale investors [10]. The safety net does not stretch that far, and by design: the wholesale regime switches off most of the retail protections long before any loss is incurred.

Every newborn, a private asset owner

Fisher Funds has committed more than $1 billion of KiwiSaver money to private equity, the largest publicly announced commitment to date [11]. Most other major providers also carry exposure, and per the FMA report most plan to lift those allocations over the next three years [2]. On Sunday, Christopher Luxon announced that, if re-elected, KiwiSaver would become compulsory from 2028, every newborn would be auto-enrolled with a $1,500 Baby Boost defaulted into a high-growth fund, and the combined contribution rate would reach 12% by 2032 [12]. Every newborn New Zealander would begin their financial life with a private asset exposure they did not choose, in a vehicle they cannot exit until at least 2090.

Structure is not the same as transparency

None of this makes private assets an inherently bad asset class. The issue is the layering, the marketing, and the question of who benefits from the door opening now. Where the exposure is plainly structured, a named partnership backing identifiable businesses with disclosed allocations, the picture is more straightforward than where it runs through layered offshore fund-of-funds with opaque manager economics. But structure on paper is not the same as transparency in practice. Diligent managers have tried to look through some of the better-regarded local vehicles and come up short on what is actually held and how it is valued. If the people whose job is to see inside cannot, the ordinary member certainly cannot. We do not invest our own clients in this asset class, for precisely these reasons. It would be premature to suggest New Zealand has quietly cracked private assets when the same transparency, valuation and liquidity questions remain.

Here is what matters most, and what the marketing almost never spells out: understand whether your commitment is fully funded on day one or subject to future capital calls. Some private equity is paid up front, with no further obligation, clean and simple. Much of it is not. A commitment of thirty cents on the dollar today can trigger calls for the remaining seventy cents in the years ahead. Your disclosed allocation now will not reflect your actual exposure tomorrow; as the calls arrive, your percentage holding and your real risk are multiplied. A trustee who signs off on what looks like a modest five percent allocation can find the true commitment is several times that once the fund draws down. I have watched exactly this happen to a community trust, where a decision made by earlier trustees carried obligations that only became visible years later.

For trustees, this is not simply an investment preference; it is a governance question.

Under the Trusts Act 2019, trustees of family and charitable trusts inherit a look-through duty [13]. Few today can name the private asset exposures they are responsible for, let alone the unfunded commitments sitting behind them. Asking the question is the first part of discharging the duty.

Four questions for any provider, adviser, or co-trustee:

  1. What are the all-in fees across every layer?

  2. How are the underlying assets valued: how often, and by whom?

  3. Is the commitment fully funded, or subject to future capital calls?

  4. In whose interest is the allocation being recommended?

The answers should be plain and confident. If they aren't, that itself is a flag you shouldn't ignore.

Robbins is right that private equity has outperformed historically. Dimon is right that the credit cycle still exists. What is less often spoken about is who benefits from unlocking the door now, and why.

Private. Special. Exclusive. Useful words for the fee machine; less useful for the person handing over their money. You are not joining the club; you are funding it.


Nick Stewart

(Ngāi Tahu, Ngāti Huirapa, Ngāti Māmoe,
Ngāti Waitaha)

Financial Adviser and CEO at Stewart Group

  • Stewart Group is a Hawke's Bay and Wellington based CEFEX & BCorp certified financial planning and advisory firm providing personal fiduciary services, Wealth Management, Risk Insurance & KiwiSaver scheme solutions.

  • The information provided, or any opinions expressed in this article, are of a general nature only and should not be construed or relied on as a recommendation to invest in a financial product or class of financial products. You should seek financial advice specific to your circumstances from a Financial Adviser before making any financial decisions. A disclosure statement can be obtained free of charge by calling 0800 878 961 or visit our website, www.stewartgroup.co.nz

  • We do not hold or advise on any private credit or private equity investments.


REFERENCES

  1. Financial Conduct Authority (UK). Long-Term Asset Fund regime, FCA Handbook COLL 15. HM Treasury (2025). Inclusion of LTAFs in stocks and shares ISAs. gov.uk.

  2. Financial Markets Authority (2026, 15 April). Private assets in managed funds: Investment landscape and valuation practices. Accompanying media release: “FMA anticipates KiwiSaver providers will increase investment in private assets.” Source: FMA.

  3. Simplicity (2026, 24 June). “Simplicity backs ambitious Kiwi innovators with $30m investment.” Details: $30m cornerstone commitment to Bridgewest Venture Fund I (Deep Tech and Health Sciences Fund). Provider disclosure context: Booster, Milford, Generate, Pathfinder, ANZ Investments and others carry private asset allocations across growth and high-growth options.

  4. The Diary of a CEO with Steven Bartlett (2026, 15 January). “Tony Robbins: No One Is Ready For What’s Coming.” Details: transcript references Robbins’ stakes in 95 private equity firms, the firms, not the funds, receiving the “2 and 20” on each.

  5. Bain & Company (2025). Global Private Equity Report 2025. Details: fee conventions of 1–1.5% management plus 10–20% carry above a preferred return. Supporting context: MSCI, Chicago Booth Review and NBER research on buyout outperformance of roughly 3–5% per year over public market equivalents, with debate over the role of leverage, survivorship bias and the illiquidity premium.

  6. CAZ Investments. Firm overview and GP-stakes strategy. Robbins, T., Zook, C. and Mallouk, P. (2024). The Holy Grail of Investing. Simon & Schuster.

  7. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (2026). Annual Letter to Shareholders 2025. Author: Jamie Dimon. Released April 2026. Source: JPMorgan Chase & Co.

  8. Reserve Bank of New Zealand (2026, May). Financial Stability Report. Details: private credit market concerns. Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand.

  9. Financial Markets Authority (2024, 21 August). “Du Val Group: statutory management ordered.” Source: FMA. Supporting coverage: BusinessDesk (2025, 4 August), “A year since raids, FMA yet to prosecute over Du Val collapse.”

  10. Lindeman Investments Limited v Financial Markets Authority [2025] NZHC. Judgment date: 11 July 2025. Summary source: Cooney Lees Morgan, “The FMA safety net has limits when it comes to wholesale investor groups.”

  11. NZ Herald, The Prosperity Project (2025, 4 August). “The rise of KiwiSaver investing in private equity and what it means for you.” Details: Fisher Funds committing more than $1 billion of KiwiSaver funds to private equity.

  12. New Zealand National Party (2026, 21 June). “National To Further Boost Kiwis’ Financial Security.” Details: press release, annual conference, Lower Hutt. Coverage: NZ Herald, RNZ, 1News, Newsroom and Scoop (21–22 June 2026). Estimated fiscal cost: $1.1 billion over four years.

  13. New Zealand Parliament (2019). Trusts Act 2019, ss 30–31.


We Had Better Have a Plan – Corrections, Risk and Tolerance

With the corrections occurring in the market and the markets doing what they have always done efficiently… It’s time to stop, breathe deep with both feet firmly on the ground, and reassure ourselves of the why and what is of our financial position and plan.

The Downsides of DIY Investing

With home ownership out of reach for many people, we’re seeing shifts in investing priorities that align with generational differences, particularly from Millennials and Gen Z. Following on from Boomers, who are tipped as the wealthiest generation in history, things are tough in a world where costs keep rising and outpacing income.

Do You Need Life Insurance in Your 20s?

Building a strong financial foundation in your 20s begins with having the right tools. A budget is one thing you'll need, especially if you're focused on building an emergency fund, saving for retirement or paying off debt. Life insurance is something else you ought to add to your toolbox. But does life insurance for young adults make sense?

Don’t risk being under-insured

Owning something valuable, such as a house, car or boat, without insuring it means taking a huge financial risk. For that reason, around 95 per cent of New Zealanders have insurance to protect against loss due to disaster, accident or theft. However, when it comes to protecting themselves and their family’s future, the majority have little or no insurance cover.