The Squeeze Play: When Essentials Outpace Everything Else

There's a peculiar phenomenon unfolding across New Zealand households, and it doesn't add up. While families cut back on discretionary spending, three relentless forces continue their upward march: rates, power, and insurance premiums.

Kiwibank's latest inflation analysis reveals the problem.[1] Overall inflation sits at 3%, but council rates are up 8.8% year-on-year and electricity has surged 11.3%. Meanwhile, rent and building costs remain soft, responding as they should to economic pressure. This is Economics 101 – except for the outliers that won't bend.

Households respond to price signals by cutting spending, businesses adjust to market conditions, but monopolistic and quasi-monopolistic services continue their upward trajectory regardless of economic headwinds. When essentials become the only thing still inflating, we're not seeing healthy price discovery – we're watching economic dysfunction concentrate in the places people can't escape.

The Democratic Disconnect

In Hastings – Hawke's Bay's largest district – the mayoral election delivered an instructive lesson in vote-splitting. Marcus Buddo had a detailed plan about rates, spending, and debt. Steve Gibson had a plan of ideas. Damon Harvey had a plan of sorts. Between them, they split the centre-right vote.[2][3] Wendy Schollum had a plan to have a plan – and won with 6,722 votes, representing 26.06% of the total vote.[3]

What ratepayers inherited is a focus on process, not outcomes. The problem isn't reviewing assets or benchmarking contracts – it's the absence of a clear plan for cutting spending, reducing debt, and passing savings to ratepayers. In her first month, the new mayor reported focusing on "bringing our new council together," "establishing how we'll work as a team," and "meeting with staff to look at how we can do more with less."[14] Classic "all hui and no doey" [16,17]– lots of meetings, team-building, and singing while rates grow at triple the rate of inflation.[1] 

The RBNZ may deliver some further relief through rate cuts, as economists predict.[1] But that relief will be swallowed by cost increases that don't respond to monetary policy. Council rates aren't discretionary. Power bills aren't negotiable. Insurance premiums exist beyond household bargaining power. The very things households need most are the things rising fastest, creating a squeeze that monetary policy cannot relieve.

The Rates Reality

Hastings imposed a 19% rates increase for 2024/25[5][6] and another 15% for 2025/26.[7] These aren't just numbers on a page – they represent real pain for households already stretched thin by the cost of living crisis. For an average property paying $3,000 annually, rates have jumped to approximately $4,000, with another increase pushing that toward $4,600.

Ratepayers have done their bit – the cyclone-specific targeted rate elevated these increases to the upper band among New Zealand councils. But here's the problem: this is temporary revenue with a 16-year sunset clause,[6] yet spending patterns suggest permanent cost increases have been baked in, with significant portions funding non-cyclone expenditure.

When the cyclone charge expires, does the council try to keep ratepayers paying the cyclone charges to fund other council nice-to-haves, or does it reduce rates? The current trajectory builds in a structural deficit that future ratepayers will inherit. It's a classic government budget problem: temporary revenue streams funding permanent spending commitments. The logic doesn’t add up, and costs get kicked down the road regardless.

Across New Zealand, councils have faced unprecedented cost pressures. A 2024 report commissioned by Local Government NZ found that construction costs for bridges increased 38%, sewage systems 30%, and roads and water supply systems 27% over three years.[8] The average rates increase across the country hit 15% for 2024/25,[8] with some councils proposing even higher increases. But these pressures, while real, don't explain why councils can't find operational efficiencies to partially offset infrastructure cost inflation.

The Residential Reckoning

Nowhere does this squeeze play out more starkly than in residential rental property, where New Zealand's retirement wealth delusion meets economic reality.

For decades, Kiwis were sold a simple story: property is the path to retirement security. Buy a rental. Watch it appreciate. Collect rent. Retire comfortably. It's been cultural gospel, reinforced by favourable tax treatment and the absence of capital gains taxes. An entire generation built its retirement strategy around this asset class.

But that story is fast becoming a tragedy. Residential landlords face the same 8.8% rates increase, insurance premiums that have doubled or tripled post-Gabrielle.[1] These costs aren't negotiable. They simply arrive and must be paid. Unlike businesses that can adjust their cost structures or pass costs to customers, landlords operate in a market with hard ceilings.

Tenants can't just absorb corresponding rent increases endlessly. The market has found its ceiling through the hard limit of what people can actually pay when their own costs are climbing. Tenants are facing their own squeeze – grocery bills up, power bills up, their own insurance costs rising. There's no capacity to absorb 8-11% annual rent increases. So who wears it? The landlord.

When non-negotiable costs grow at 8-11% annually, but rent increases are market-capped at 3-4%, the gap widens, and the squeeze tightens. Properties once generating positive cash flow now require subsidies from other income. The "investment" becomes a wealth destroyer rather than a wealth builder.

The residential property investment model was built for an era where rates grew modestly and insurance was predictable. That era is over. We now have a cohort who bet retirement security on an asset class where holding costs accelerate faster than income. Some will sell. Some will hold on, hoping for capital appreciation to compensate for negative carry. Many will discover too late that their retirement strategy has a fundamental flaw.

It's sad – not because property investors deserve special sympathy, but because it represents massive misallocation of national savings. An entire generation channelled wealth-building into residential property instead of productive assets or diversified investments. Capital that could have funded business growth, innovation, or infrastructure went into bidding up house prices instead. Now they're discovering that when monopolistic cost structures meet market-limited revenue, leverage works in reverse.

The Policy Vacuum

The Kiwibank data disproves the myth of symmetrical adjustment.[1] Households adapt. Markets respond. But essentials march to their own drum, disconnected from broader economic discipline. This asymmetry matters because it means traditional economic responses – tightening monetary policy, reducing household spending – fail to address the source of inflation when it concentrates in monopolistic services.

The government is considering rates-capping legislation to refocus councils on "doing the basics, brilliantly."[10] But rates capping may be only the opening salvo. The Government has just announced proposals to eliminate regional councillors entirely, replacing them with 'Combined Territories Boards' made up of mayors.[15] More significantly, each region will be required to prepare a 'regional reorganisation plan' within two years, with options including merging territorial authorities into unitary councils. The Government's stated goal: "cut duplication, reduce costs, and streamline decision-making."[15]

For councils like Hastings already stretched thin by cyclone recovery, this represents both opportunity and threat.

The opportunity: forced consolidation might finally deliver the operational efficiencies that should have been found voluntarily.

The threat: poorly designed reorganisation could create even larger bureaucracies with less accountability. The pressure to demonstrate fiscal discipline just intensified dramatically.

Council external debt has surged from $353 million in December 2023[11] to $472 million as at 30 June 2025,[13] and is projected to reach $700 million by 2030.[9] That's debt more than doubling in less than three years, with the trajectory showing no signs of slowing. Interest payments alone consume an ever-larger share of rates revenue, creating a vicious cycle where borrowing to fund current operations crowds out funding for actual services.

With voter turnout at just 44.71%[3] and Schollum winning with 26.06% of votes cast, approximately 12% of eligible voters delivered her a victory. She has three years to prove she deserves to be re-elected, which means proving she understands how angry ratepayers are about rate rises. The mandate is thin. The patience is thinner.

For property investors, the question is starker: how long can negative carry be sustained before the retirement wealth strategy becomes the retirement wealth trap? For how many years can landlords subsidise tenants from other income before they capitulate and sell? And when they do sell, who buys investment property with known negative carry characteristics?

Until we confront why essentials climb at double-digit rates while the broader economy slows, we're not solving inflation. We're watching it concentrate in the places people can't escape. That concentration makes the burden harder to bear and the economic distortions more severe.

That's not economics adapting. That's economics breaking down, one essential service at a time.

Nick Stewart

(Ngāi Tahu, Ngāti Huirapa, Ngāti Māmoe, Ngāti Waitaha)

Financial Adviser and CEO at Stewart Group

• Stewart Group is a Hawke's Bay and Wellington based CEFEX & BCorp certified financial planning and advisory firm providing personal fiduciary services, Wealth Management, Risk Insurance & KiwiSaver scheme solutions.

• The information provided, or any opinions expressed in this article, are of a general nature only and should not be construed or relied on as a recommendation to invest in a financial product or class of financial products. You should seek financial advice specific to your circumstances from a Financial Adviser before making any financial decisions. A disclosure statement can be obtained free of charge by calling 0800 878 961 or visit our website, www.stewartgroup.co.nz

• Article no. 435

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References

[1] Kiwibank Economics (2025). "NZ Inflation: What's really happening?"

[2] NZ Herald (2024). "Hastings mayoral race - Wendy Schollum claims the win, but her closest rival hasn't conceded."

[3] NZ Herald (2024). "Local elections 2025: Wendy Schollum new Hastings Mayor as last-minute voters extend her lead."

[5] Hastings District Council (2024). "Council reduces proposed rate increase."

[6] Wikipedia (2025). "2022–2025 term of the Hastings District Council."

[7] NZ Herald (2025). "Central Hawke's Bay tries to lower rates hike to 10% as cyclone-hit Hastings sticks with 15%."

[8] 1News (2024). "New Zealand homeowners facing an average rates rise of 15%."

[9] NZ Herald (2024). "Hastings facing one of highest rates rises in country - council could hit $700 million debt."

[10] RNZ (2025). "Local Government New Zealand crying foul over potential rates capping."

[11] NZ Herald (2024). "Hastings District Council nearly $400 million in debt as cyclone costs compound."

[13] Hastings District Council (2025). "2024-2025 Annual Report."

[14] Schollum, W. (2024). Facebook post, Mayor Wendy Schollum of Heretaunga Hastings, November 2024.

[15] New Zealand Government (2025). "Local Government Reorganisation Proposals." BayBuzz Special Alert.

[16] NZ Herald. (2020). Too much hui and not enough do-ey: Why workplace meetings can be wasteful. Retrieved from https://www.nzherald.co.nz

[17] National Māori Authority. (n.d.). Matthew Tukaki on suicide prevention: “Too much hui and not enough doey – so we are taking action right now.” Retrieved from https://www.nationalmaoriauthority.nz

The 12-Month Tax Gambit: Labour's Calculated Risk

Announcing a major tax policy a year before an election isn't just unusual; it's almost unheard of.

Conventional political wisdom dictates you either implement unpopular measures early in your term, or promise them after securing victory. Labour's decision to foreground a 28% capital gains tax ‘CGT’ a full year out from polling day demands examination, particularly through the lens of economist Arthur Laffer. His insight cuts straight through political calculation: speeding fines are a tax. Governments use taxes to stop people doing things they don't want them to do. So why would you tax investment when the country desperately needs more of it?¹

The timing becomes immediately suspect. Labour sits in opposition facing a National-led government, and historically, opposition parties campaign on aspiration rather than taxation. Helen Clark's 2005 Labour government actively campaigned against CGT proposals, recognising the electoral toxicity.² Yet here we are in late 2025, with Labour essentially writing National's attack ads 12 months in advance.

The Political Theatre

The political play is obvious: announce now, let the controversy "settle," and by election day the CGT feels like old news rather than shocking revelation. Labour hopes voters will be desensitised to what might otherwise be campaign-ending policy. It's political inoculation through extended exposure, with the policy carefully designed as "CGT light" (exempting family homes, farms, KiwiSaver and shares) to avoid the comprehensive wealth taxation that spooked voters in previous attempts.²

Yet as business commentator Damien Grant observes, the policy amounts to "a marketing plan sketched on the back of a napkin that had been used to wipe the lipstick off a chardonnay glass after drinks at a Fabian Society soiree."⁶ The policy amounts to a few pages in a glossy press release with less substance than a frozen coke.

If you own property in July 2027 and sell it after that date, you pay 28% of any increase in value, with no allowance for inflation. Family homes are exempt. That's essentially it—the rest is left to imagination and future consultation.

Recent polling shows Labour's framing is working – 43% support versus 36% opposition.² The 12-month runway allows this narrative to solidify. Labour bets that sustained messaging about "fairness" will ultimately land better than National's "tax on ambition" counter-narrative.

Laffer Curve | Source: Norway's Wealth Tax Unchains a Capital Exodus

The Fine Fallacy

Laffer's analogy cuts through the fluff. When government fines speeding, fewer people speed – that's the point. When government taxes cigarettes heavily, fewer people smoke – that's the objective. These are taxes deliberately designed to discourage the behaviour.

Applied to investment taxes, the logic is inescapable. When government taxes investment gains at 28%, fewer people invest. Yet that's meant to be revenue-neutral economic policy rather than deliberate discouragement? You cannot fine an activity and simultaneously expect more of it.

The contradiction becomes starker considering New Zealand's actual needs. Treasury warns that 52% of total tax comes from personal income tax, and the group paying this tax is shrinking due to an ageing population.⁴

The country desperately needs productive investment in commercial property, business expansion, and capital formation. Yet Labour proposes taxing precisely these activities, at rates designed to be punitive enough to raise revenue.

This is the economic equivalent of installing speed cameras on the motorway while simultaneously complaining that traffic isn't moving fast enough. You cannot discourage and encourage the same behaviour simultaneously.

The Implementation Damage

The July 2027 implementation date provides convenient political distance: win in November 2026, govern for eight months, then introduce legislation.²

But here's where political cleverness creates economic damage - the announcement effect begins immediately. Why would a developer start a commercial property project in 2026 knowing that any gains realised in 2028 or 2029 will face 28% taxation? Investment decisions from now until 2027 will be distorted by anticipated future taxes, locking capital out of productive uses or sending it offshore.³

The economic damage begins not when the tax takes effect, but when it's announced. We're living through that damage period now. The speeding camera has been installed, and the signs are up; don't be surprised when drivers slow down.

The British Warning

Laffer's analysis of Gordon Brown's decision to raise Britain's top rate from 40% to 50% provides the cautionary tale. The UK Treasury's own "Laffer section" showed the increase "not only did not get more revenue, it got you a lot less prosperity. People left the country, people used tax shelters, dodges, loopholes, all that."¹ As Laffer emphasised, this wasn't his opinion imposing American economics on Britain—"This was Britain doing the Laffer curve."¹

As Laffer notes from decades of US tax data: "Every time we've raised the highest tax rate on the top 1% of income earners, three things have happened. The economy has underperformed, tax revenues from the rich have gone down, and the poor have been hammered."¹

Conversely: "Every single time we've lowered tax rates on the rich, the economy has outperformed. Tax revenues from the rich have gone up and the poor have had opportunities to earn a living, to live a better life."¹

The Practical Nightmares

The practical problems compound the economic ones. Grant notes that inflation has already created havoc in Australia, where properties often can't be sold “because almost all of the price is considered a capital gain. This will be worse on the Hipkins plan because there is no indexation.”⁶

Consider a property bought in 2015 for $500,000 is now worth $800,000. Under Labour's plan, the entire $300,000 gain faces 28% taxation – that’s $84,000. But how much of that gain is real appreciation versus inflation? Without indexation, investors pay tax on phantom gains that merely reflect currency debasement.

Meanwhile, definitional nightmares await. Australia's capital gains tax guide runs to 339 pages, with court judgements adding hundreds more.⁶ Is replacing a kitchen a capital improvement or maintenance? What about landscaping? A 2028 Fisher and Paykel dishwasher replacing a 1980s Westinghouse: expense, or capital upgrade? As Grant notes drily: "Tax lawyers and accountants will be kept busy."⁶

The Chartered Accountants Institute supports Labour's proposal – hardly surprising, given it guarantees full employment for their profession dealing with compliance complexity.

The Fiscal Illusion

Even Chartered Accountants acknowledge that CGTs "do not generate significant revenue in the short or even medium terms. Long term, however, they typically provide a steady revenue stream… Using them to cover a specific policy expense is unusual."⁴ Yet Labour wants to use this non-existent revenue immediately to subsidise doctor visits.

As Grant observes: "There is a cash shortfall on Labour's own analysis in the early years which, like everything else in this policy, the resolution is left to the imagination."⁶ Here's the speeding fine logic again: if you install cameras to generate revenue from fines, you're simultaneously reducing the very behaviour that generates the revenue.

Successful speed cameras mean less speeding, and therefore less revenue. A capital gains tax that successfully deters property speculation means less property investment, and again, less revenue.

The Historical Pattern

This is Labour's seventh CGT attempt since 1973.² Norman Kirk's first attempt taxed gains at up to 90%, a rate so confiscatory it was quickly abandoned. Phil Goff's 2011 version, David Cunliffe's 2014 proposal, and Jacinda Ardern's 2019 attempt all failed politically.

Each previous effort proved politically costly and economically counterproductive. Voters instinctively understand Laffer's speeding fine logic, even if they can't articulate the economics by name. They recognise taxing investment reduces investment, just as fining speeding reduces speeding. Winston Churchill’s timeless observation perfectly captures the impossibility of taxing your way to prosperity – you cannot stand in a bucket and lift yourself up by the handles.⁵

The Alternative Vision

Laffer's prescription for struggling economies is brutally simple: "You want a low-rate, broad-based flat tax, spending restraint, sound money, minimal regulations, and free trade. And then get the hell out of the way."¹ Labour offers the opposite with new taxes on capital, sketchy implementation details, and revenue projections that don't add up.

As Laffer puts it: "Poor people don't work to pay taxes. They work to get what they can after tax. It's that very personal and very private incentive that motivates them to work, to quit one job and go to another job, to get the education they need to do it."¹ Replace "poor people" with "investors" and the logic remains - capital seeks returns. Tax those returns heavily enough, and capital goes elsewhere.

Perhaps most revealing: if this policy were genuinely beneficial for economic growth, why the elaborate political choreography? The answer lies in Laffer's observation about lottery tickets: "Everyone—tall, short, skinny, fat, old, young—they all want to be rich. Why does your government then turn around and tax the living hell out of the rich?"¹

New Zealanders don't want to punish success; they want pathways to achieve it themselves. They buy lottery tickets hoping to strike it rich. The government encourages dreams of wealth while simultaneously taxing the achievement of wealth.

The Verdict

The election will shortly reveal whether Labour's calculated 12-month strategy succeeds politically. By announcing early, they've given the policy time to settle, given themselves something concrete to campaign on, and satisfied membership demands for action on wealth taxation.

But both Laffer's economic analysis and Grant's practical critique suggest that regardless of electoral outcome, the policy itself represents strategic error. It's economic theory ignored in favour of political positioning.

New Zealand has better options. Genuine broadening of the tax base, reform of property taxation to encourage productive use, addressing infrastructure bottlenecks, and creating conditions for productivity growth would all contribute more to long-term prosperity than taxing capital gains at 28%. But those approaches require the hard work of reform rather than the easy politics of taxing "wealthy property investors."

Is Labour's CGT announcement politically canny, or economically catastrophic? When you deliberately discourage an activity through taxation, you can’t be surprised when you get less of it.

Labour has installed the camera; investment will slow accordingly. Whether that's clever politics or economic self-harm depends entirely on whether you're focused on winning the next election or building the next generation's prosperity.

As Laffer would note, you cannot tax an economy into prosperity. And you most certainly cannot stand in a bucket and lift yourself up by the handles.

Nick Stewart
(Ngāi Tahu, Ngāti Huirapa, Ngāti Māmoe, Ngāti Waitaha)

Financial Adviser and CEO at Stewart Group

• Stewart Group is a Hawke's Bay and Wellington based CEFEX & BCorp certified financial planning and advisory firm providing personal fiduciary services, Wealth Management, Risk Insurance & KiwiSaver scheme solutions.

• The information provided, or any opinions expressed in this article, are of a general nature only and should not be construed or relied on as a recommendation to invest in a financial product or class of financial products. You should seek financial advice specific to your circumstances from a Financial Adviser before making any financial decisions. A disclosure statement can be obtained free of charge by calling 0800 878 961 or visit our website, www.stewartgroup.co.nz

• Article no. 433

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References

1. Simmons, M. (2024). Reality Check: Interview with Arthur Laffer. Times Radio.

2. Opes Partners (2025). 'Does New Zealand Have a Capital Gains Tax? [2025]'. Available at: https://www.opespartners.co.nz/tax/capital-gains-tax-nz

3. RNZ (2025). 'What you need to know: Seven questions about a capital gains tax'. Available at: https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/business/577065/what-you-need-to-know-seven-questions-about-a-capital-gains-tax

4. Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand (2025). 'Capital gains tax must be considered as part of tax reform'.

5. Churchill, W.S. (1906). For Free Trade. London: Arthur Humphreys.

6. Grant, D. (2025). 'Hipkins' capital gains tax policy leaves more questions than answers'. Stuff. Available at: https://www.stuff.co.nz/politics/360878756/damien-grant-hipkins-capital-gains-tax-policy-leaves-more-questions-answers